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Abstract
Research Summary: Ownership is fundamental to
firm strategy, organization, and governance. Standard
ownership concepts—mainly derived from agency and
incomplete contracting theories—focus on its incentive
effects. However, these concepts and theories neglect
ownership's role as an instrument to match judgment
about resource use and governance with the firm's
evolving environment under uncertainty. We develop
the concept of ownership competence—the skill with
which ownership is used as an instrument to create
value—and decompose it into matching competence
(what to own), governance competence (how to own),
and timing competence (when to own). We describe
how property rights of use, appropriation, and transfer
relate to the three ownership competences and show
how our theory offers a fresh perspective into the role
of ownership for value generation.
Managerial Summary: Business owners own with
different levels of competence, and differences in own-
ership competence matter for value creation. We argue
that ownership competence consists of competence
about what to own (matching competence), compe-
tence about how to own (governance competence), and
competence about when to own (timing competence).
We clarify the role played by each of the three
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competences for value creation. We also show how the
importance of ownership competence for value crea-
tion alters depending on ownership concentration, life
cycle effects, uncertainty of the environment, and the
efficiency of resource markets. With our paper, we pre-
pare the ground for a fuller understanding of the strate-
gic role of owners for value creation.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Strategy scholars have long recognized ownership as a vehicle for creating economic value
(Barney, 1986; Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Typically, the role
ascribed to ownership is that it shapes the incentives of those engaged in value creation. For
instance, agency theory suggests that granting ownership to those who otherwise exercise only
delegated control over resources creates high-powered incentives for effort that mitigate moral
hazard (Amihud & Lev, 1999; Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Rajan, 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In addition, incomplete contracting theory argues that
granting such ownership provides incentives to invest in assets and resources and circumvents
opportunistic bargaining or holdup (Hart, 1995; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978;
Williamson, 1985).
However, ownership has another less emphasized, but more obvious economic function.
Ownership implies irrevocable control over resources, which may be particularly valuable when
coordinating resources under uncertainty (Coase, 1937; Foss & Klein, 2012). In particular,
owners gain residual control rights over resources—rights to decide resource use in conditions
not specified by prior agreement (Hart, 1995). This control afforded by ownership allows
owners to deploy resources in novel ways: acquiring and selling resources, investing in them, or
recombining them according to the owners' unique, idiosyncratic, and ultimately inalienable
beliefs about paths to value creation.
Building on the notion that ownership affords control in resource deployment, we develop
the argument that ownership can be exercised with greater or lesser competence and that this
matters to value creation. The dominant incentive view of ownership ignores such variation in
competence and misses the fact that competence may be imperfect and differently distributed
across owners (Foss & Lien, 2010). The incentive view of ownership implicitly assumes actors
are homogeneous, and therefore ownership simply motivates and shapes behavior. For exam-
ple, incomplete contracting theory assumes that whichever decision-maker plays the ownership
role will exercise this role efficiently by managing and investing in assets in ways that maximize
economic value (e.g., Hart, 1995: chap. 2). But, in actuality, strategies for creating maximum
value, including the governance arrangements that support such paths, are not widely, com-
monly and correctly understood (Denrell et al., 2003). For this reason, matching assets to indi-
viduals who can create most value with them (i.e., the efficient owners) is not automatic, and
assets routinely end up in the hands of less efficient owners. We argue that changing who owns
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resources may have a far greater influence on value creation than changing the concentration
of that ownership. Consider the extraordinary value composed by granting Steve Jobs and
Apple's other owners licensed control of resources composed at Xerox or of transferring owner-
ship of real estate on the outskirts of small towns into the hands of Sam Walton's Wal-Mart.
Such differences in outcome are hard to assign to a simple shift in incentives that accompanies
these ownership changes.
Following Alchian's (1961: 63) suggestion that “people differ in their talents as owners,” we
propose that resource owners vary in the skill with which they deploy resources under their
control toward economic value creation. Research at the intersection of corporate governance
and entrepreneurial finance on “smart money” (Lungeanu & Zajac, 2016; Sorensen, 2007),
descriptions of “active ownership” (Carlsson, 2003; Jensen, 1989), studies of family businesses
(Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2007), and comparative analyses of owner-
ship types (Hansmann, 2000) all suggest that some individuals or groups are better at owning
than others. While this prior literature acknowledges some variance in ownership competence,
it fails to explore its foundations and its substantial theoretical implications.
In this article, we lay out the foundations and implications of a competence view of owner-
ship. We begin by distinguishing the three ownership rights central to classical property rights
theory, namely the right to use, the right to appropriate rents from and the right to transfer
resources (Alchian, 1961; Foss & Foss, 2005; Kim & Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1986) that lead to
the identification of three novel competencies: “matching competence,” “governance
competence,” and “timing competence,” respectively. Exercising ownership competence is then
the combined execution of these three competences toward value creation.
2 | MEANINGS OF OWNERSHIP: INCENTIVES, CONTROL,
COMPETENCE
2.1 | The different meanings of ownership
What is “ownership”? In economics and law the definitions of ownership and closely related
notions such as “possession,” “property,” and “property rights” are highly contested
(e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, 2004; Demsetz, 1988; Underkuffler & Underkuffler, 2003). In gen-
eral, ownership is conceived as a bundle of rights, the most important being possession, exclu-
sion, and control. However, these are ambiguous terms. For instance, what is “control” exactly,
and how much control must be possessed by an individual to qualify as “owner”? And, are all
three necessary for ownership? Most social science and legal scholars seem to agree, however,
with Oliver Wendell Holmes's (1881: 246) famous statement on the essence of ownership:
“Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is allowed to exercise his natural powers over
the subject matter uninterfered with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people
from such interference.” Thus, Holmes (1881) proposes that discretion in the use of assets and
the right to exclude nonowners are key to the definition of ownership.
Apart from law, the most systematic analyses of ownership exist in economics. Specifically, three
streams of thought in economics seek to define ownership and explore its consequences, namely,
agency theory, incomplete contract theory, and property rights economics; see Table 1. All implicitly
or explicitly focus on ownership as vehicle to reshape incentives in the pursuit of value creation.
Agency theory—a theory widely used in management research to explore ownership phe-
nomena (Boyd & Solarino, 2016)—associates ownership primarily with rights to derive residual
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4 FOSS ET AL.
income (i.e., profit) from an asset, and makes predictions about the effectiveness of remedies,
such as incentive and monitoring systems, required to overcome diverging interests between
owners and managers of assets. It propagates an incentive-based view of ownership and predicts
that individuals choose ownership arrangements that maximize jointly created value, given
such constraints as asymmetric information and costly monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Agency theory generally proffers that granting managers ownership stakes or residual income
rights will improve the incentives of managers to engage in value-creating efforts.
Incomplete contracting theory emphasizes the “residual rights of control” tied to ownership,
meaning the right to make decisions over assets in situations not addressed by contract
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). Here parties to a contract know the efficient level or form
of investment, but incentives may be structured such that efficient investments are not chosen.
Particular focus is placed on the challenge of soliciting investments complementary and specific
to an asset owned by another party, thereby creating a holdup problem (Williamson, 1985). In
this theory, changes in ownership are made in order to create incentives that facilitate optimal
investments. A central conclusion is that the surplus in a team effort is maximized when owner-
ship of assets is allocated to the party that makes the most important investments
(Hansmann, 2000; Hart, 1995; Kim & Mahoney, 2002).
Finally, property rights economics is centrally focused on the multidimensional nature of
ownership (Alchian, 1961; Barzel, 1997; Coase, 1960; Libecap, 1989). In particular, the theory
highlights the distinction between rights to exercise choices over goods and services (use rights),
the rights to derive income from these choices (value appropriation rights), and the right to
transfer these rights (transfer rights) (Alchian, 1961). At the heart of the economic notion of a
property right is effective control (Barzel, 1997), and whether that control is exercised by con-
trolling access to a resource, deriving income from it, or selling it. Individuals who exercise such
control over assets are the asset owners.
2.2 | Problematizing the traditional views of ownership
A prominent theme running across all three theories is the idea that ownership is simply a tool
that, when deployed correctly, aligns incentives among parties and leads to high economic value
creation. In agency theory, more concentrated ownership leads to fewer agency problems and
higher levels of value creation (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). In incomplete contracting theory, own-
ership provides incentives to optimally invest in resources and should therefore be allocated to
the party who will make investments that matter most for value creation. In property rights the-
ory, an actor's rights to a resource shape incentives to use it well, for instance, encouraging
investment in maintaining the resource (Barzel, 1997). The common idea is that by allocating
ownership “correctly”—in accord with the respective theoretical predictions—and thereby get-
ting the incentives right, value creation will be maximized (subject to the various constraints
the parties face).1
1Another challenge with incentive perspectives on ownership is that they largely derive, particularly the agency theory
version, from a conception of a firm with widely dispersed ownership (cf. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). But, the vast
majority of firms exhibit concentrated ownership structures. Most are sole proprietorships, where owners have full
control over their firms, have large fractions of their wealth invested in their firms, and are actively involved in day-to-
day management. Incentive alignment is not really the central challenge.
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Our primary concern with the incentive view of ownership is its limited appreciation for
ownership's strategic role in shaping both how resources are accessed and the resource bundles
that are formed in pursuit of economic value (Penrose, 1959). Owners and potential owners
hold divergent theories about the optimal paths to value creation and the role that assets may
play in this process (Felin & Zenger, 2017). Which theory is empowered through ownership
profoundly shapes outcomes. For example, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find that for the larg-
est European companies, owner identity had an impact on firm outcomes, over and above own-
ership concentration. They not only find that firms vary in their profit goals, dividends, capital
structure, and growth, but that these depend on whether a founding family, banks, institutional
investors, other nonfinancial companies or governments have ownership and control. Different
owners follow different paths to value creation and appropriation.
The fundamental problem that stymies an appreciation of the strategic role of ownership is
that our dominant theories of ownership implicitly assume cognitively homogenous actors.
Accordingly, these ownership theories pay little attention to the importance of owners' idiosyn-
cratic cognition or cognitive frames (Kaplan, 2008; Walsh, 1995), specifically their beliefs about
whether to own assets, for what purposes, and precisely how the assets should be deployed
toward value creation. Such divergent beliefs reflect an owner's judgment (Foss & Klein, 2012)
or her theories about value-creating resource configurations (Benner & Zenger, 2016; Felin &
Zenger, 2009). These remain essential for value creation even though the owner can delegate
particular decision rights to others (members of the board, top managers; Castanias &
Helfat, 1991; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009) by partitioning use rights (Alchian, 1961). Still, the owner
cannot fully delegate the right to ultimately determine for what purpose an asset will be used,
what rights to it will be delegated and to whom, and if and when ownership should change
(Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2001). These rights are reserved for the owner per se—and ensure
that the owner has ultimate control to steer asset uses in ways that support the owner's
envisioned path to value creation (Schulze & Zellweger, 2020).
Against this background, it is interesting to observe that the venture capital literature is
replete with arguments that assign owners a more strategic, value-creating role. For example,
Sorensen (2007) finds that the two essential aspects of what he calls “smart money” are
“influence,” which means that experienced VCs add value by reconfiguring a firm's resource
portfolio, and “sorting,” which implies that experienced venture capitalists invest in better
companies. Baum and Silverman (2004) make a similar argument, suggesting that venture
capitalists are particularly good “coaches” and “scouts.” That is, VCs are particularly skilled
at injecting sound business judgment into ventures and at picking ventures with value appre-
ciation potential (Hellmann & Puri, 2000). Sorensen (2007: 2725) also finds persistence in VCs
returns, which he concludes reflects “heterogeneity in the skills of these investors” (see also
Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). The performance variance that such owners generate thereby seems
to reflect both the owners' innate ability as well as accumulated experience (Gompers, Ishii, &
Metrick, 2003; Lafontaine & Shaw, 2016; Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & Taylor, 1993). In this
way, the strategic role of ownership is underdeveloped, which is an important limitation as
we move beyond the context of atomistic make-or-buy decisions to the level of firms or indus-
tries. An improved understanding of firm boundary decisions, and by extension ownership,
requires theorizing that is “more strategic and concerned with broader outcomes such as
growth and value creation” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005: 492). We agree and submit that an
expansion of our understanding of ownership to also include the competence with which
ownership is exercised will improve our understanding of value creation.
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3 | OWNERSHIP COMPETENCE
In light of the shortcomings outlined above, we advance a competence perspective of ownership
that combines arguments found in the managerial capabilities (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Castanias &
Helfat, 1991; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007), property rights
(Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1986), and entrepreneurship literatures (Felin & Zenger, 2009; Foss &
Klein, 2012). We argue that owners vary in the competence with which they exercise property
rights over the resources they own such that firm-level value creation varies with owner
competence.
3.1 | Key assumptions of the ownership competence perspective
We first assume that owners seek to create value under conditions of Knightian uncertainty
and vast complexity, where not only outcomes, but also the set of possible resources and strate-
gies to achieve those outcomes, are not known ex ante (Kerr, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2014;
Knight, 1921). Owners, like entrepreneurs, exercise judgment under uncertainty, projecting
beliefs about means, ends, and the causal relations between resources and ends onto reality
(Van den Steen, 2010, 2017). The owner's theories about the paths to value creation, including
what to own and how to own, differ markedly across actors (Felin & Zenger, 2009;
Hacking, 1983). Sometimes the owner's judgment, that is, his theory of value creation (Foss &
Klein, 2012), proves valuable, sometimes it does not. In fact, ownership affords the control that
is of particular value when acting under uncertainty. Absent uncertainty, ownership itself is
unnecessary, as an actor can simply contractually compose the required control over assets, and
obtain the foreseen returns.
Second, strategic factor markets for judgment are “closed,” as the costs of articulating judg-
ment in such a way that it can be objectively assessed by the market are prohibitive (Benner &
Zenger, 2016; Foss & Klein, 2012). Because of the vast complexity stemming from the myriad
resource combinations conceivable, the uncertainty about the correct price of resources
(Denrell et al., 2003), different priors regarding future events and dynamics (LeRoy & Singell
Jr, 1987), and different learning (Levitt & March, 1988), resource owners will often hold widely
divergent theories—differing beliefs and cognitive models (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) about the
most valuable paths to value creation. The idiosyncrasy of these theories will make it difficult to
communicate them in ways that convince others of their superiority, rendering vast inefficiency
in any form of market for these beliefs or theories (Benner & Zenger, 2016). The problem is not
merely a lack of skills in persuasion. Rather, beliefs, theories and judgment are often quite idio-
syncratic. Moreover, the most useful theories of value are likely to be unique in their underlying
logic or judgment, as it is uniqueness that permits those possessing them to see value that
others cannot (Felin & Zenger, 2017). However, the uniqueness of a theory also renders its
value more difficult to convey or to persuade others of (Litov, Moreton, & Zenger, 2012).
Third, the only sure path to test one's judgment and capture the value that is eventually cre-
ated is for the actor to assume ownership of the resources. Given problems of idiosyncrasy, per-
suasion, and market frictions, only by assuming (controlling) ownership, does an individual gain
the control necessary to compose the value conceived, circumvent the disbelief held by others,
and thus seek to prove herself right about the superiority of her judgment. Indeed, scholars have
often pointed to ownership arrangements and changes in those arrangements as crucial to indus-
trial dynamics and economic growth, because they precipitate entry and exit and other forms of
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asset reallocation (e.g., Chandler, 1962; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Ownership allows new firms to
replace poorly performing old ones and facilitates movement of assets toward firms with higher
productivity or value for customers (Foster, Haltiwanger, & Krizan, 2001). Ownership permits the
crafting of complementarities from pooling, sharing, and otherwise combining resources that
would be costly to obtain via contracting between independent firms (Argyres & Zenger, 2012) or
via internal accumulation processes (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Ownership changes allow resources
to be bundled and rebundled rather quickly, which reduces what would otherwise constitute a
serious factor market constraint on value creation.
Fourth and finally, functions of ownership reach beyond rights to income to encompass use
and transfer rights (Libecap, 1986). When assuming asset ownership, owners retain rights to
transfer assets to other owners, to liquidate assets, and even abuse assets, which grants owners
the right to change course, to learn from prior resource deployments, and flexibly alter the
resource mix. This is of importance when a theory of value creation has to be altered, eventually
outright rejected, or alternatively, a buyer proposes a price for a resource that is beyond the use
value the resource has for the current owner (Denrell et al., 2003; Hacking, 1983). Ownership
thus also conveys the right to make the final assessment of the quality of the judgment. There-
fore, a multifaceted perspective of ownership is required, one that accommodates ideas of resid-
ual income, residual control, and transfer rights.
3.2 | Toward a competence perspective of ownership
Armed with these assumptions, we propose that variation in economic value creation can be
partly explained by heterogeneous levels of owner competence in exercising property rights over
resources that owners choose to assemble and control. Our thinking concurs with Alchian's (1961:
63) observation that “people differ in their talents as owners” and that this “[o]wnership ability
includes attitude toward risk bearing, knowledge of different people's productive abilities, fore-
sight, and, of course, judgment.”2 Our theorizing about ownership competence is based on classic
property rights theory (Alchian, 1961; Barzel, 1997; Coase, 1960; Kim & Mahoney, 2002). Classic
property rights theory maintains that whenever an individual owns a resource, he retains (a) the
right to use the resource, (b) the right to appropriate the returns from using the resource, and
(c) the right to transfer these rights (Libecap, 1986; Mahoney & Kor, 2015). We argue that owners
vary in the competences with which they deploy the right to use, the right to appropriate, and the
right to transfer. We call these competences (a) matching competence (knowing what to own),
(b) governance competence (knowing how to own), and (c) timing competence (knowing when to
own), respectively. We thus define ownership competence as the skills with which asset owners
exercise matching, governance, and timing competence (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Helfat &
Peteraf, 2015). Ownership competence generates economic value via superior skill about what to
own, how to own, and when to own3 (see Figure 1 and Table 2).
2In the context of comparative political systems, Pelikan (1993) offers a similar argument and suggests that since
ownership competence (a concept that he likely first coined) cannot be assessed and allocated by a central governing
body (e.g., a central planning bureau), the selection and matching processes of free markets are required to efficiently
allocate such competence.
3In accordance with work on managerial skills (Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001), ownership skills refer to the innate and
learned abilities, expertise and knowledge. We use the terms “skill” and “competence” interchangeably
(Danneels, 2016).
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Before we unpack the three dimensions of ownership competence, an example may shed
light on the central underpinnings of our reasoning. Assume an individual actor foresees good
potential to start a taxi business in her neighborhood and concludes that her own car is
unsuited for that purpose. She thus decides to secure a loan and buy a car to be used for the
purpose of her venture (What to own). When starting out, the owner faces the choice between
driving the car herself and letting someone else drive it. When letting a chauffeur drive the car,
the owner will have to monitor the chauffeur, and decide how to split between her and the
Economic
Value
GovernanceMatching
competence
«what to own»
competence
«how to own»
Ownership
competence
Timing
competence
«when to own»
right
Property
use
Right to Right to
appropriate
Right to
transfer 
FIGURE 1 Property
rights and ownership
competence
TABLE 2 Property rights and ownership competence
Property right Definition of property right Associated ownership competence
Right to use Right to freely determine the
usage of an owned resource
Matching competence: What to own
• Definition of a valued purpose
• Foresight and creativity about valuable
resource (re)configurations
• Attitude toward risk bearing
The skill to foresee valuable resource
combinations toward achieving a purpose.
Right to appropriate Right to appropriate the benefits
from the deployed resource
Governance
competence:
How to own
• Manager selection
• Rent-sharing regime: Incentive and stock
ownership plans, pay out policy
• Monitoring regime: Budget and reporting
policy
The skill to set the appropriate incentives for
maximized value creation.
Right to transfer Right to delegate the other two
rights
Timing competence: When to own
• Market timing: Acquiring undervalued
and selling overvalued resources
• Staging of investments: Risk reduction and
generation of strategic flexibility
• Succession planning: Assessing whether
one is still the best owner
The skill to time investments into resources
for maximized value creation.
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chauffeur the income that is eventually generated (How to own). In the end, the owner may
conclude that it is best to transfer ownership to a competing taxi firm that sees more value in
her taxi business than the owner sees herself (When to own). Note that the role of the manager
(in this case the chauffeur) is distinct from the role of the owner. The manager/chauffeur is the
person running the taxi business, and will thus deal with the immediate operations of the busi-
ness (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007), and will exercise derived judgment about how to best run
the firm (Foss, Foss, & Klein, 2007). But it remains the inalienable right of the owner to deter-
mine whether there will be a taxi business in the first place, who will run its operations, how
eventual profits are split, and whether it is time to pass on ownership to someone else. This styl-
ized example illustrates the strategic role the owner retains in exercising her three property
rights of use, appropriation, and transfer, and attendant ownership competences, which we
explore in fuller detail next.
4 | EXERCISING OWNERSHIP COMPETENCE: WHAT,
HOW, AND WHEN TO OWN
4.1 | What to own: Matching competence
Matching competence refers to an individual's capacity to foresee, judge, or theorize about valu-
able resource combinations that achieve some “specific and intended purpose” (Helfat &
Winter, 2011: 1244) or solve a unique problem (Felin & Zenger, 2017). An actor with matching
competence may envision a novel problem and a novel configuration of assets to solve it. For
instance, an individual may envision the need for a taxi service that caters to mobility-impaired
patrons and imagines a set of assets to address this need. Since owners hold use rights over
resources, and thereby possess wide discretion about their use, identifying the purpose or prob-
lem to solve ultimately rests with the owner and is a necessary precondition for the ensuing
resource orchestration process (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003;
Penrose, 1959). In consequence, the development and understanding of that purpose is central
to integrating required resources and assembling capabilities.
Owners who score high in matching competence are thus particularly good at composing
theories or mental representations (Csaszar & Levinthal, 2016; Felin & Zenger, 2009) that guide
their search for and orchestration of valuable resource (re)combinations toward achieving a val-
ued purpose (Weber & Mayer, 2014). Therefore, matching competence requires a superior
understanding of the value of the resources currently possessed, an understanding of the value
of resources others possess, and a capacity to imagine the value created through alternative con-
figurations (Bower & Gilbert, 2005). There is space for matching competence in the transfer of
resources from lower to higher valued uses because under uncertainty resources are often not
perfectly priced and brought to their highest-valued use. In an uncertain, entrepreneurial con-
text, investment and divestment decisions are often not made in a competitive Darwinian con-
text, but well before an owned resource configuration can compete in the product market or
have positive cash flow (Kerr et al., 2014). By deciding what to own in exercising this matching
competence, the owner thus defines the boundary of the firm.
Matching competence and the related capacity to foresee valuable resource configurations is
also critical for value creation because resources have multiple attributes—uses, functions, and
complementarities with other resources. The array of combinations is sufficiently vast and com-
plex to specify ex ante, and therefore experimentation and use are critical to assessing value
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(cf. Foss & Foss, 2005; 2008; Kerr et al., 2014). So are theories and judgment (Felin &
Zenger, 2017; Foss & Klein, 2012). As Demsetz points out, “there is an infinity of potential
rights of actions that can be owned. […] It is impossible to describe the complete set of rights
that are potentially ownable” (Demsetz, 1988: 19). Hence, matching competence provides eco-
nomic actors with the capacity to simulate and conduct thought experiments about the value of
alternative resource configurations, thereby overcoming “functional fixedness,” defined as a
mental block against using an object in a new way to solve a problem (Felin, Kauffman, Mas-
trogiorgio, & Mastrogiorgio, 2016), to reveal latent resource uses, and engage in out-of-the-box
creative thinking (e.g., Margolis & Laurence, 2007). The aptitude to imagine a valuable future,
involving not yet discovered or created attributes and uses of resources is thus central to
matching competence.4
Matching competence is related to what the venture capital literature calls the ability to
“pick winners” or to select better matched resource bundles from the many proposed
(Sorensen, 2007). Owners with better matching skills see value in available resources that can
be productively rearranged or recombined with the existing resource base of the owner
(Baum & Silverman, 2004). They recognize assets that are “underpriced assets” in their current
arrangement, precisely because they recognize more valuable alternative arrangements. Others
may simply recognize owners with a superior capacity to match resources, and then coinvest
with these more competent owners.5
The literature on private equity contracting highlights these rights to exercise matching
competence (Cumming & Johan, 2013). Private equity investors typically retain rights to make
decisions regarding the focus, structure, and boundaries of portfolio companies. They approve
any changes in articles of incorporation or by-laws, and retain rights to approve mergers, insol-
vency, or spin offs, changes in business participations, property, material sales or purchases of
assets, and financing decisions. Private equity investors delegate portions of these tasks, but
retain ultimate authority to revoke such delegation. Under an ownership competence perspec-
tive, it is the right to privilege their own purpose, foresight, and creativity about valuable
resource (re)configurations and the assessment of risks in these endeavors that enables the exer-
cise of matching competence.
4.2 | How to own: Governance competence
Governance competence refers to an individual's capacity to compose through effective gover-
nance and organization design an envisioned resource composition. What we call governance
competence gets closest to the aforementioned idea of “getting the incentives right” and reflects
an understanding of incentive alignment principles inherent to the governance literature dis-
cussed earlier. From that literature we know that when governance structures are appropriately
4Foss and Klein (2012) define entrepreneurial judgment as decision-making about resource allocation under Knightian
uncertainty. As Foss, Klein, and Bjørnskov (2019) point out, while the term judgment is often associated with wisdom,
prudence or foresight, the judgment-based approach does not make any assumptions about the accuracy of an
entrepreneur's judgment—only that the act of resource assembly under uncertainty constitutes the exercise of
judgment. We can thus think of matching competence as the accuracy with which entrepreneurial judgment is
exercised.
5For instance, Hsu (2004) finds that high-reputation VCs possess this type of capacity as they acquire start-up equity at a
10–14% discount. These VCs have what Hsu (2004: 1805) calls “extra-financial value”—a capability that is distinct from
“their functionally equivalent financial capital.”
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matched to transactions (Williamson, 1996) performance improves (e.g., Leiblein, Reuer, &
Dalsace, 2002). First, an owner must decide whether to self-compose an envisioned resource
bundle or alternatively hire a manager to do so. The choice of managers rests inalienably with
the owner, and crafting an effective alignment between managerial skills and the resource con-
figuration requirements is essential to performance (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Tripsas &
Gavetti, 2000). The owner is free to appoint herself as manager, but may also choose to appoint
some other person deemed more skillful in organizationally composing the envisioned strategy.
While delegating the management task may generate agency costs, the capacity to hire superior
managerial skill may more than outweigh these costs. Of course, this manager selection is con-
ducted under information asymmetries about the skill sets of outside managers and with clear
market frictions in attempting to secure the optimal match (e.g., firms in rural areas may have
problems finding a suitable manager). In choosing to self-manage, the owner eliminates infor-
mation asymmetry (although admittedly she may not fully know her own capacity) and benefits
from reduced agency costs. However, the owner-manager may not possess the required skillset
to reconfigure resources, especially when considering the dynamic evolution of required skills
over the life cycle of a resource (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011).
Delegation is particularly common where ownership is dispersed and exercised in groups, such
as in equity partnerships. To avoid the coordination costs of collective decision-making, owner-
ship groups will typically delegate day-to-day decision authority to professional managers.
Governance competence is also concerned with skillfully managing the distribution of rents
generated within firms in ways that provide value-generating incentives. Owners with gover-
nance competence will assemble incentives, controls, and delegation arrangements into value-
generating patterns. They will appropriately deploy behavioral and outcome-based incentive
systems (Eisenhardt, 1989), and will be cognizant of motivation crowding out (Frey &
Jegen, 2001), as they seek to assemble resources in ways their judgment envisions. Owners with
high levels of governance skill will also craft incentives in patterns consistent with their own
risk profile. Diversified owners will want managers to take risk and will thus favor high-
powered outcome-based incentive contracts, whereas owners with a concentrated wealth
position will want to limit risk taking with their resources (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000). Owners with high levels of governance competence will thus minimize the costs
of monitoring and bonding (Castanias & Helfat, 1991), as they pursue their theory of value crea-
tion. Concomitantly, by holding residual income rights—the right to appropriate all remaining
rents after all contractually agreed payments have been made, the owner will also have to
define how much of the residual will be appropriated by herself, and hence will be paid out
rather than retained and reinvested.
Owners with governance competence also have the capacity to allay holdup concerns
among stakeholders from whom relationship-specific investments are sought, as these actors
will “look ahead, perceive hazards, and factor these back into the contractual relation”
(Williamson, 1996: 9). For instance, firm-specific investments by suppliers and employees may
be desired. Owners with high levels of governance skill will shape relationships both formally
and informally to encourage valuable firm-specific investments.6 Relatedly, owners competent
6Conversely, exactly because they understand the limitations of contracts, competent owners should also be aware of
the risks they themselves run when committing their resources to a partner in relationship-specific ways and will thus
seek reassurances against holdup. Owners with high levels of governance competence should thus be skilled in drafting
contracts that enhance value creation, such as by including (premature) termination agreements, and agreements that
define the intellectual property developed during the collaboration (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Mayer & Argyres, 2004).
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in governance will also understand when it is advantageous and when it is not to reallocate
ownership rights by sharing ownership with key partners.
4.3 | When to own: Timing competence
Timing competence refers to the skill of owners to time their investment in projects in ways
that maximize value creation. It encompasses temporal decisions about when to enter and
when to exit (Henriksson & Merton, 1981). While matching skills help identify what resources
to combine and governance skills help govern that recombination, timing skills help identify
when to secure these resources (Ivashina & Lerner, 2019). Significant evidence in the finance
literature suggests that the value of resources is highly time dependent, and timing-competent
owners are therefore skillful in managing the timing of resource acquisition and disposal. For
instance, Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that skillful boards issue equity when the market
values of their firms are high, relative to book and past market values, and repurchase equity
when the market values are low. Similarly, Lerner (1994: 293) concludes that “seasoned venture
capitalists appear to be particularly proficient at taking companies public near market peaks.”
Timing skills thus include the skill to optimize what Henriksson and Merton (1981) call “mar-
ket timing” or the value generated by expanding the valuation multiple between the time of
acquisition and the time of sell (Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, 2014). The strategic factor market
intuition underlying timing competence is that owners compose value in an uncertain environ-
ment through arbitrage, correctly forecasting and exploiting resource price fluctuations. Via
access to idiosyncratic information, timing competence grants owners the opportunity to “beat
the market” (Denrell et al., 2003: 977), avoiding the purchase of assets in boom years, while
buying during bust years. Relatedly, Bushee (1998) finds that “sophisticated” owners contribute
to firm value by shielding managers from the pressure to engage in myopic behaviors in the
face of earnings declines.
Timing skill also takes into account that a resource's actual value may be initially hidden,
and only progressively revealed, as the resource is put to its intended use (Neus & Walz, 2005).
Timing skill thus includes a capacity to spread or stage asset investments with uncertain value
across time. Such staging lowers the risks of imperfect market timing following a false assess-
ment of economic cycles and asset price movements, and reduces investment risk since the
deferral of the investment goes hand in hand with a progressive revelation of its true value.
Risky upfront investments are reduced in size and eventual follow-on investments into that
asset become less risky (Folta & Janney, 2004; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Weitzman, 1979). Consis-
tent with such a signaling argument, Janney and Folta (2003) find that seasoned investors pre-
fer a gradual investment into an asset and that this reduces the holdup risk when investments
are cospecialized (Hart & Moore, 1990; Neher, 1999).7
7In consequence, transfer skill should include the capacity to benefit from the particular time structure of the cash flows
that an asset generates. For instance, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) document that the timing of actual cash
outflows and inflows into assets is an important factor in understanding the performance of private equity funds. These
authors find that the draw down and capital return schedules of a venture capital fund are critical to understanding the
value that the funds' owners are able to generate. Acknowledging the time structure of cash flows generated by an
asset also leads these authors to conclude that calculating interim internal rates of return on invested assets may be
misleading given the illiquidity of many resources. A corollary of the insight that timing is a critical driver of value
creation is an appreciation not only for the risk-adjusted returns to an investment but also for the time value of money
so that the efficient allocation of capital is supported (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Ivashina & Lerner, 2019).
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Owners with timing competence also have capacity to schedule their investments to opti-
mize strategic flexibility. Staged investments not only limit risk, but provide strategic flexibility
(Leiblein, 2003; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017), enabling firms to balance the virtues of both com-
mitment and flexibility in the allocation of resources. These real options confer the right, but
not the obligation, to take specific action in the future. They provide strategic flexibility in the
face of uncertain irreversible investments, allowing owners “to capitalize on favorable opportu-
nities and mitigate negative shocks by proactively confronting uncertainty over time in a flexi-
ble fashion, rather than by attempting to avoid uncertainty” (Leiblein, 2003: 948) (see also
Folta & O'Brien, 2004; Miller & Folta, 2002). Thus, timing-competent owners effectively use real
options to optimize strategic flexibility and commitment. A timing-competent owner also pos-
sesses enough humility to recognize when another owner possesses a superior matching compe-
tence, or a superior inventory of complementary resources. This second owner should be
willing to acquire the resource bundle from the current owner at a lump-sum price greater than
its discounted present value to the current one. Timing-competent owners under these circum-
stances recognize that now is not the time to own the resources and make the trade.
Timing skills thus involve the capacity to judge whether one is (still) the “best owner”
(Dobbs, Huyett, & Koller, 2009), an argument that accords with a significant stream of research
suggesting that a firm's comparative capabilities play an important role in defining its bound-
aries (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Leiblein &
Miller, 2003; Poppo & Zenger, 1998). Put differently, an owner may hold the necessary compe-
tences to effectively manage a resource portfolio for some time. However, competitive forces
and technological change may make the ownership competences of the current owner relatively
less valuable, eventually outdated and obsolete, so that a next owner, with advanced ownership
competences, can create more value with the given resource portfolio. Timing-competent
owners may thus proactively plan their ownership exit.
4.4 | Distinctiveness of matching, governance, and timing
competence
Matching, governance, and timing competences are distinct and separable, and individual
owners may possess varying levels of each. They may therefore choose to externally access
owner competences that they lack. Examples abound of owners who fail to recognize the limits
of or focused nature of their owner competence, such as founder-owners who use brilliant
matching and initial governance competence to envision and compose a valuable business, but
then stay at the helm too long (Wasserman, 2006). An owner may be strong in matching and
governance competence but have difficulty knowing when to transfer ownership to someone
with even better matching and governance competence. We can imagine, and in practice
observe, further combinations of ownership competences. For instance, family firms often have
problems in attracting and motivating talented nonfamily managers, which points at reduced
levels of governance competence (Neckebrouck, Schulze, & Zellweger, 2018). Also, because of
transgenerational control intentions, family firm owners tend to subjectively overvalue their
firms in comparison to the market price (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012),
which suggests impaired timing competence. However, because of their unique industry know-
how and deep networks, family firms may possess high levels of matching competence
(Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). Historically, corporate raiders such as T. Boone Pickens
and KKR have thrived on their timing competence by unbundling and redistributing what they
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believe to be inefficient corporate portfolios. Similarly, activist investors like Nelson Peltz claim
superior matching competence and then seek to impose and exploit that competence by taking
minority ownership positions in firms, proposing alternative judgments about the use of the
firm's assets, then convincing the boards of the veracity of these judgments. Warren Buffet has
been described as a remarkable exemplar of ownership competence and, while he may possess
multiple types of ownership competence, he seems particularly adept at timing competence, a
competence to buy, sell, and invest with remarkable timing.
Ownership competences also appear to be learnable, as owners gain experience within
industries, through governing, and from repeated asset transfers (Matsusaka, 2001). Experience
may deliver heightened understanding of available resources and their valuable recombination,
as well as an understanding of how to improve their governance and transfer. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that even those individuals who are systematically good at starting and owning
resources, and by extension firms, get better the more firms they have started and owned
(Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2006; Lafontaine & Shaw, 2016).
4.5 | Ownership competence in context
The importance of ownership competence for value creation—to bring about optimal asset
matches, effective governance, and appropriate shifts in ownership—will likely vary according
to context. We explore several contextual factors below.
4.5.1 | Ownership concentration
The value of ownership competence is contingent on the concentration or diffusion of owner-
ship, as activist investors know well. When an owner only controls a small fraction of equity,
her power to deploy ownership competence is constrained. Therefore, greater ownership con-
centration is not only about resolving agency problems, but also granting control to owners
selected for their matching, governance, and timing competence. Getting this match wrong has
important performance consequences. For instance, Feldman and Montgomery (2015: 113) find
that the “presence of directors who lack top-level experience but own large shareholdings is
negatively associated with firm value, and that firm value tends to rise after such directors
depart from boards.” In our competence perspective, the level of control/ownership retained by
the owner is not the cause of value creation. What matters is the level of ownership granted to
those with ownership competence (Castanias & Helfat, 1991); ownership concentration is better
understood as a moderator in the relationship between ownership competence and value crea-
tion. Specifically, high levels of ownership concentration elevate the positive impact of compe-
tent owners and dampen the negative effects of incompetent ones.
Typically, when owners are competent, their competence is best exercised by a single con-
trolling owner, such as the firm's founder, or by a small group of owners with homogeneous
vision and a controlling interest, such as a founding team. Founding teams may also hold com-
plementary ownership skills such that matching, governance, and timing competences are all
present and complementary within the team. However, exercising ownership competence in
larger groups with diffuse ownership poses challenges, as collective-action problems are layered
on top of the individual owner's competence. While the costs of exercising her matching, gover-
nance, and timing skills are internalized by the respective owner who exercises these skills, the
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benefits are shared with all other owners. This entices the owner under diffuse ownership to
shirk on her owner competence (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). A partial remedy to such collective-
action problems is to allocate ownership rights to a controlling party with a strong interest in
the success of the venture and with high levels of owner competence (Foss & Klein, 2018;
Hansmann, 2000).
4.5.2 | Life cycle effects
Ownership competence also has important connections to the life cycle of an enterprise, with
different competences of particular importance at different phases. At startup, matching compe-
tence is particularly valuable as new-venture success depends on assembling an initial configu-
ration of resources that matches the entrepreneur's judgment or theory about future, uncertain
value creation. As Sirmon et al. (2011: 1401) explain, “in the start-up stage, an entrepreneur
concentrates on structuring the firm's resource portfolio as the foundation for subsequently
bundling resources to form the capabilities on which the venture's business model will operate.”
Matching competence is thus crucial in the founding stage given the need to align resource
orchestration with the owner's, that is the founder's, vision.
With growth, professionalization and the appointment of managers will become a prerequi-
site for further value creation (Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Schulze & Zellweger, 2020). Needing to
delegate authority to these agents, the owner must select managers, draft monitoring and rent-
sharing regimes, and protect the firm and its intellectual property against being held-up by con-
tracting parties, such as key personnel, clients, and suppliers, which moves governance compe-
tence to the foreground.
As the firm matures, timing competence will take on an increasingly important role.
Resources such as fixed assets and networks may become less valuable over time and an
owner's capacity to effectively shed resources, acquire new ones, or time the sale of the entire
enterprise should become particularly important. Furthering value creation may require
shifting the mix of assets, and timing the exit and purchases is central to value creation in this
phase (Matsusaka, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2011).
4.5.3 | Environmental uncertainty
Ownership competence is particularly valuable in turbulent, uncertain environments, as firms
scramble to adapt to, as well as originate unanticipated changes. Matching competence is
uniquely important under uncertainty because the optimal owner–resource matches are diffi-
cult to discern ex ante. Moreover, frequent environmental shocks make it hard to perform con-
trolled experiments, placing extra weight on the owner's idiosyncratic capacity to imagine and
judge, and diminishing the value of a rule-based, algorithmic search for optimal matches.
Uncertainty, as evidenced by highly unstable prices, rapidly changing technology, and fluc-
tuating competitor market shares, should lead to more disagreement and differing priors
regarding a theory's probability of success. As Knight (1921, p. 231) observed, under uncertainty
“business decisions […] deal with situations which are far too unique [… ] for any sort of statisti-
cal tabulation to have any value for guidance. The conception of an objectively measurable
probability or chance is simply inapplicable.” Van den Steen (2017: 4550) observes that “funda-
mental uncertainty forces people to rely on intuition and judgment, which are by definition
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subjective,” so that personal views about a firm's optimal strategy and required resource
matches should become particularly valuable, not least to enforce the optimal strategy that may
be highly controversial among different observers.
Moreover, uncertainty also complicates the process of monitoring others' decisions, and thus
increases the marginal value of governance competence retained by the owner. For instance,
the noisier the firm's environment, the more important it is for the owner to monitor
(Burkart & Panunzi, 2006), draft contracts that provide reassurances against holdup, and care-
fully arrange the distribution of value that is being generated. Uncertainty also makes it impor-
tant to carefully adapt payout policies to support the stability and continued success of the firm.
Timing competence is important under environmental uncertainty as well because under
uncertainty “there is often no way to resolve such uncertainty except by waiting for the out-
come” (Van den Steen, 2017: 4550), so that temporal flexibility in the (re)allocation of resources
is of heightened value. In other words, uncertainty often proves previously effective ownership
arrangements untenable, yielding greater returns to resource reallocation; from a real-options
perspective, greater uncertainty makes strategic flexibility reflected in timing competence par-
ticularly valuable (Folta & O'Brien, 2004; McDonald & Siegel, 1986; Miller & Folta, 2002). In
other words, the competence view should dominate the incentive view of ownership when the
boundary choice about what to own and not to own takes place in an uncertain environment
where efficiency is less germane (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005).
4.5.4 | Factor market efficiency
For matching, governance, and timing competence to create value there must be some ineffi-
ciency in markets for assets/resources, including management talent. If these factor markets
are perfectly efficient, meaning that the price of any resource always reflects its value in the best
conceivable use (e.g., Barney, 1986; Denrell et al., 2003), then ownership competence cannot
add value. In such an equilibrium state, resources are already in the hands of those with the
highest levels of competence (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). In other words, all resources are in their
highest-valued uses, orchestrated by the owners most competent in arranging them. However,
in the real world of uncertainty, high complexity, and error, ample disequilibrium allows own-
ership changes or newly deployed competence to generate new value. Of course, legal, regula-
tory, cultural, or other barriers may make the process of exercising that competence difficult.
But absent various transactional hazards, such as small-numbers bargaining, entry barriers,
asymmetric information, and legal or institutional restrictions on exchange (Coase, 1937, 1960;
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Williamson, 1985), the opportunity to gen-
erate value from ownership competence disappears.
5 | DISCUSSION
Ownership has long been of interest to strategic management research. However, discussions of
ownership in our field have predominantly focused on the incentive effects of ownership. While
strategy, finance scholars, and economists have focused on minimizing the agency costs of sepa-
rating ownership from management, our analysis suggests that solving agency problems may be
less important than minimizing efficiency losses from separating ownership and competence.
Thus, our starting point was that extant theorizing neglects that ownership can be exercised
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with heterogeneous competence, and that such ownership competence is multidimensional.
More specifically, we developed notions of competence in matching, governance, and timing,
and explored their implications for value creation.
5.1 | The role of ownership competence in strategic management
theory
Strategic management is already rich with theories and a reasonable question is whether strat-
egy demands the addition of ownership competence as a construct. We believe that ownership
competence—the skill with which ownership is exercised to create value—already underlies
the central theories of strategy and entrepreneurship, but often in ways that are implicit and
unstated. Featuring the role of competence in ownership more centrally and explicitly in theo-
ries of strategy and organization will contribute to a more comprehensive view of the strategic
path to value creation.
Whether economic actors are composing value through vertical integration decisions, pursu-
ing horizontal expansion, or choosing activities to secure competitive advantage, the underlying
drivers are more similar than different. We argue that they all echo a similar theme: value is
created when those who possess competence in matching resources assume ownership, those
skilled at managing provide efficient governance, and those with appropriate timing control
buying and selling. Elements of this overarching logic for the path to value creation are
scattered across various theories in strategy. However, largely missing is a clear articulation of
the role that ownership competence plays.
First, consider the positioning school as extracted from industrial organization economics
and popularized by Porter (1985). This approach implicitly assumes an economic actor who
envisions a valuable position to occupy and then arranges assets and activities in a way that
enables the occupation of that position—that is, an actor high in what we call matching compe-
tence. Largely absent from this theory, however, is the role that ownership plays in securing
this location, or a clear discussion of when ownership is necessary to compose the configuration
an economic actor envisions.
Second, consider transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985). This theory begins mid-
stream in the value creation process. It implicitly assumes an economic actor who has already
composed or conceived of a pattern of exchanges or has identified some configuration of assets
and activities. The central question in this theory is then how to craft the set of incentives
required to induce the desired composition or support the desired exchange. While ownership
is central to this theory and the efficient construction of governance more generally, there is lit-
tle discussion of the matching or timing competence possessed by the economic actors that nec-
essarily seeds this theory and its conclusions.
Third, consider strategic factor market logic (Barney, 1986). The underlying logic of this the-
ory is that economic actors compose value as they purchase resources at prices below their
future value in use. Economic actors with superior expectations about value in a future use
enjoy a clear path to value creation, as they simply purchase resources at a discount. However,
absent from this theory is a clear discussion of when the focal firm needs to own the under-
valued resource, rather than rent it on a long-term basis. Our reasoning suggests that a firm
should seek outright ownership of these resources not only when they are underpriced, but
when control rights are essential for capturing the value created by putting these resources to
use under uncertainty. Moreover, the strategic factor market logic says little about the origin of
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the superior expectations that fuel this path to value creation. We hypothesize that these supe-
rior expectations reflect heterogeneous ownership competence among economic actors.
Similarly, in the broader resource-based logic emphasis is placed on composing unique and
inimitable resources or combinations of resources (Barney, 1991). While considerable attention
is placed on the attributes of these resources or resource bundles, much less is devoted to articu-
lating when and where ownership is required to assemble these or the origin of their concep-
tion. We argue that ownership competence in matching, governance, and timing are in most
instances central to the formation of unique, valuable, and inimitable resource bundles. Our
approach thus complements recent work in dynamic capabilities, resource orchestration, and
managerial cognition (e.g., Helfat et al., 2007; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009), all of which deal with the
ability of firms or managers to create, deploy, and modify resource bundles. Ownership compe-
tence can be understood as a set of higher-level competences situated at the level of the owner,
which include when to establish, restructure, or dissolve a firm; which managers to hire and
fire and how to direct those managers; how resources should be financed and how those funds
should be distributed; and when to hand ownership responsibilities to another party.
The recent surge of interest in management practices (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007) and
their effect on productivity and profitability also calls for a greater understanding of owners and
how they create the environment within which management can add value to resources. As
noted above, while some of the tasks typically reserved for the owner can be delegated to man-
agers, the owner decides which of her rights are delegated to managers. The continuous—but
often hidden—role and influence of owners can be seen from the fact that managers, and also
board members, can be dismissed. Ultimately, these professionals execute derived judgment
(K. Foss et al., 2007) on the basis of loaned authority (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1999). In
turn, ownership competence is also distinct from board competence, which captures the skill to
discipline and support management, which is typically rooted in previous managerial experi-
ence, financial literacy, and personal networks of board members (Johnson, Schnatterly, &
Hill, 2013; Krause, Semadeni, & Withers, 2016).
Finally, consider the added value logic derived from cooperative game theory
(Brandenburger & Stuart Jr, 1996). This theory highlights the portion of value that alternative
economic actors contributing resources to joint production effort can individually extract.
Again, there is an implicit assumption of an economic actor (or perhaps a set of economic
actors) who envision and compose this valuable bundle of assets and resources. However, there
is again no discussion of the role ownership plays or the origins of economic actors' conceptions
of the bundle of complements that generate the value over which economic actors compete. We
believe that here again matching, governance, and timing competences are critical to explaining
the cooperation and competition dynamics highlighted by the added value framework.
Our broader view is that too much theoretical effort has been devoted to pitting these alter-
native theories of strategy against one another in a logical horserace. In large measure these
theories are simply explaining different aspects or phases of economic actors' efforts to create
and capture value. However, largely absent from all of these theories is a clear understanding
and explicit articulation of a central economic actor who with varying competence conceives of
valuable asset and activity arrangements and composes them through effective governance. Not
surprisingly, absent this central actor in the foundational theories of strategic management,
strategic management courses are critiqued as “repositories of multiple frameworks that that
are not tightly integrated” (Mahoney & McGahan, 2007: 86). Making ownership competence
more explicit in our theories of strategy will both enable greater synthesis and promote a richer
capacity to explain value creation and capture.
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5.2 | New predictions
Our theorizing allows us to make novel predictions about the link between ownership concen-
tration and performance. On a very basic level, our theorizing recognizes that two distinct
owners holding identical ownership stakes in what are otherwise identical companies will likely
make different decisions about how to orchestrate assets and resources, reflecting differences in
competence (Lungeanu & Zajac, 2016). The traditional incentive effects from ownership, associ-
ated with more or less concentrated ownership stakes, then serve to simply shape incentives of
owners who differ in competence. Organizations with more competent owners benefit more
from concentrated ownership, while those with less competent owners benefit less. We thus
highlight ownership concentration as a moderator of the relationship between ownership com-
petence and performance.
Our ownership competence perspective also offers new predictions about mechanisms of
value destruction by owners besides poor incentives, minority shareholder expropriation, and
holdup. For example, owners may squander resources on well-intended projects that are
doomed to fail, or surround themselves with poor advisors, or unwisely hold on to assets that
should be sold to others. Because an owner retains the ultimate authority over assets, if an
owner fails to appreciate that others know better about how these assets should be deployed,
then the owner becomes the ultimate source of inefficiencies. These inefficiencies are challeng-
ing to overcome. Unlike governance inefficiencies that can be remedied by existing owners,
ownership competence problems arise from having the wrong owners. Shrewd owners recog-
nize their incompetence and accept lump-sum payments for assets from more competent
owners. Competent owners recognize their level of competence and are sufficiently self-aware
(and humble) so as to voluntarily replace themselves when another owner holds higher levels
of competence in deploying their assets. However, ownership incompetence often engenders
persistent foregone opportunities, as current owners fail to recognize other owners' more effi-
cient compositions.
Our framework also sheds light on the sources and consequences of inefficiency in owner-
manager collaboration. What happens when competent managers work under incompetent
owners? First, managers are more likely to engage in self-serving behaviors because incompe-
tent owners are unable to detect and mitigate such behavior. Incompetent owners are thus easy
targets for managerial mischief. Second, competent managers who work under an incompetent
owner may withhold efforts to compose superior asset configurations because they feel such
efforts will be resisted by owners. Moral hazard by managers in this case is not a consequence
of opportunism as predicted by agency theory, but a consequence of frustration and
demotivation enabled by low levels of ownership competence. This creates an adverse selection
problem in which competent managers withhold effort and exit to find employment with more
competent owners. Third, managers working for incompetent owners may seek to behave as
stewards who seek to help the owner be better at owning (Miller & Sardais, 2015). This may be
particularly true—and not necessarily a sign of selfless commitment by the manager—when
managers fear that a change in ownership toward more competent owners will leave them
worse off.
Finally, we also offer new predictions about the market for corporate control. If owners
know better than managers what must be done, the market for corporate control should be
about sorting owners to best qualified managers. The inefficiency should be effectively over-
come because owners have both the power and competence to act in effective ways and to hire
the best managers (Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001). The ownership competence perspective,
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however, also accounts for the fact that a competent owner adds value beyond replacing man-
agement. By exercising governance competence via designing appropriate governance mecha-
nisms, the owner motivates managers and improves their performance. By exercising matching
and timing competence, the owner matches managers with a more appropriate set of resources.
More generally, the ownership competence perspective views the market for corporate control
as a market that primarily sorts assets to their most competent owners, and not primarily a
device to sort assets to their most efficient managers (by ousting incompetent managers and
matching assets with more competent ones). Value creation from takeover is not only the result
of improved management (Adner & Helfat, 2003), but also a consequence of improved
ownership.
5.3 | Future research
Our hypothesized direct effects of ownership competence on value creation are testable. Owner-
ship competence can be measured using techniques developed for measuring other kinds of
competences (see Danneels, 2016; Grant & Verona, 2015; Stadler, Helfat, & Verona, 2013).
Moreover, future research may compare the relative importance of our three competences. The
proposed contingency effects linked to ownership concentration, life cycle effects (see also
Sirmon et al., 2011), environmental uncertainty, and factor market efficiency are worth study-
ing. Also, our predictions about the functioning of the market for corporate control, which we
suggest is primarily about sorting assets to their best owner and not the replacement of manage-
ment, merit exploration.
We have said little about the antecedents of ownership competence. The evidence from
serial entrepreneurs suggests that ownership competence increases with experience, and that
decision frequency is a plausible overall antecedent. Many of our predictions about the alloca-
tion of ownership competence in the economy are rife for empirical testing, even without direct
measures of ownership competence. With refined measures of ownership change (asset pur-
chases and sales, corporate acquisitions and divestitures, reorganizations and restructurings), it
should be possible to establish more precise relationships between turnover and economic effi-
ciency, controlling for asset specificity and the institutional environment. Thus, there are abun-
dant opportunities for future research to clarify how ownership competence can be measured,
nurtured and taught.
Ownership competence is situated at the level of the owner, not the asset. Hence, individual
owners may be good owners of some assets but not others. There is some preliminary evidence
that owners who are effective entrepreneurs, are far less competent as investors into other
assets, such as financial assets (Zellweger, 2017). Future research may thus clarify how owner-
ship competence aggregates and links to the ownership of a portfolio of assets (Baert,
Meuleman, Debruyne, & Wright, 2016).
Owners may of course own assets for purposes that extend beyond value creation purely for
themselves or other owners. Therefore, future research may explore the assessment of owner-
ship competence filtered through the lens of the “purpose” for which assets are held
(Henderson & Serafeim, 2020; March & Sutton, 1997). Such research could more closely exam-
ine the role that competence in the pursuit of varying purposes might play, independent of
what might be more traditional measures of performance such as growth or market value
(Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997).
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5.4 | Conclusion
The key contribution of this article is to point to the overlooked competence dimension of own-
ership. We offer a typology of relevant ownership competences and theorize how these influ-
ence value creation, given moderating factors. We stress that value is created when those who
possess competence also assume ownership. Our theory not only directly relates to dominant
thinking in strategy, but also extends it by making the competence dimension of ownership
explicit.
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